Club提要：清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波于《南华早报》发文表示，《麦加共同防务协议》将沙特、土耳其和巴基斯坦结为军事同盟，表面上是三国在资金、军力与地缘雄心上的互补，实则表明美国的安全承诺已不可靠。他认为，该条约的实际威慑力有限，但具有标志性意义：虽然中东远未真正团结，但地区国家自主构建安全框架的意愿正在增强，一个由地区国家塑造的新秩序，正在从想象走向可能。

【文/ 周波，翻译/北京对话 李雨琪】

沙特阿拉伯、土耳其和巴基斯坦之间的《麦加共同防务协议》规定，对其中一国的武装攻击将被视为对三国的攻击。其真实用意是向美国传递一个信号：如果作为美国盟友并不能免于攻击，那么等待华盛顿兑现其安全承诺就毫无意义。

白宫尚未发表官方声明，这让人们不禁怀疑，是否真的如特朗普这位美国总统在其社交媒体上所言，“很高兴看到沙特阿拉伯、土耳其和巴基斯坦最近终于签署了《麦加共同防务协议》”。“这表明中东正在团结起来，也说明各国终于能以更有效的方式保卫自己。”

从表面上看，三国的需求是互补的：富裕的沙特缺乏军事能力，土耳其抱有横跨欧亚的雄心，拥有核武器的巴基斯坦则寻求财政支持。它们恰好优势互补，并以共同的逊尼派信仰为纽带。

但现在就说中东正在团结起来还为时过早。在加拿大总理卡尼于达沃斯发表具有里程碑意义的演讲，呼吁中等强国在大国竞争背景下团结起来之后，“中等强国”的概念或许正流行起来。然而，巴基斯坦和土耳其虽然明显属于中等强国，有扩展影响力的雄心，但严格来说都不是中东国家。

而且，大国不会轻易退出。从长远来看，美国在中东的角色可能会收缩，但新的地区安全架构仍少不了其身影。例如，欧盟谈论战略自主已超过十年，但乌克兰冲突暴露了这一雄心与现实之间的巨大落差：欧洲安全仍依赖于美国的领导和北约的军事保护伞。

此外，美国在该地区影响力削弱不符合以色列的利益。即使华盛顿有意退出，特拉维夫也会不遗余力地将其拉回纷争，并死死抱住美国大腿——尽管以色列在加沙的杀戮行为已经转变了相当一部分美国民众（包括年轻犹太社群）的看法。

土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安、沙特阿拉伯王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼和巴基斯坦总理夏巴兹·谢里夫在麦加会晤。三国于8月7日签署了一项联合防务协议。图源：土耳其总统府新闻办公室/法新社 发

北京方面也未就该条约发表正式声明。中国应该会对该协议持谨慎支持的立场。中国一贯倾向于支持地区主导的安全框架，并支持地区大国为其稳定承担更多责任。该条约符合中国倡导的共同、综合安全理念。

近年来，随着中国影响力增长，要求北京作为安全保障者介入的呼声日益高涨。在中东，这种呼声最为强烈，部分原因在于，中国是唯一与该地区所有国家包括以色列在内都保持友好关系的大国。

但这种外交平衡之所以能够维持，部分原因在于加沙战争之前，地区大国之间并未处于严重对立状态。一旦爆发武装冲突，敌对双方都会来寻求中国的支持，中国将陷入两难——这与其在俄乌冲突中的处境颇为相似。

俄罗斯在中东影响力虽已减弱，但尚未出局。乌克兰危机消耗了其大量能源资源，但莫斯科仍能依靠其经营多年的外交网络、与伊朗的军事技术合作以及在叙利亚残存的军事政治资产，保住其一席之地。尽管缺乏引导重大地区事件或推出重大新倡议的能力，但俄罗斯仍可扮演二线调停角色，并保持一定的武器出口。

这份条约到底能发挥多大作用？关键在于，究竟谁会入侵这三个国家中的任何一个国家。以色列更多是共同威胁而非直接敌人，很难想象它会对任一成员国发动军事打击。以色列没有理由攻击巴基斯坦或土耳其，因为他们也是美国的盟友。更何况，加沙战争爆发前，沙以关系正常化只差临门一脚。

该条约对德黑兰而言无疑是个坏消息：它联合了三个最强大的逊尼派国家，这对什叶派领导的伊朗自然不利。支持胡塞武装和真主党等代理人的成本也将更高。然而，如果连华盛顿都无法让伊朗低头，那么地区大国更不敢对德黑兰发动直接军事攻击。反过来说，伊朗几乎不可能对任何麦加协议成员国发动公开战争——其战略靠的是非对称优势和代理人手段，而非领土入侵。

2025年5月13日，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普与沙特阿拉伯王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼在利雅得。特朗普近日表示，美国与沙特达成核协议的前提是沙特承认以色列，这一表态令相关协议前景陷入不确定。长期以来，利雅得一直坚持应为建立巴勒斯坦国提供明确路径。图源：法新社

将巴基斯坦视为其主要地区威胁的印度，自然也不会乐见这一协议。如今巴基斯坦获得两个最强大穆斯林国家的支持，新德里今后若在克什米尔地区有军事行动，就必须把沙特和土耳其可能施加的压力考虑在内。尤其对印度而言，沙特是其最大的石油供应国之一，两国经济和能源关系向来密切，这份条约无疑让印度颇为尴尬；土耳其则在克什米尔问题上向来公开力挺巴基斯坦。

该条约目前只是初露端倪，但是否会开启一场地缘格局的深层变动？纵观现代历史，中东一直是外部大国的地缘政治博弈棋盘。而今天，大国左右地区局势的能力远不如二三十年前。一个由地区国家自己塑造的新秩序，已不再是天方夜谭。

（翻页查看英文）

Could Mecca defence pact be first step to new Middle East order?？

The Mecca security pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan stipulates that an armed attack against one shall count as an attack against all three. Yet the real message is directed at the United States: if being an American ally offers no immunity against attack, there is little point in waiting for Washington to honour its security guarantees.

That there has been no official White House statement casts some doubt on whether Donald Trump is really “very happy to see that Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have recently, and finally, signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement”, as the US president wrote on social media. “It shows that the Middle East is coming together and how countries will finally be able to defend themselves in a more meaningful way.”

Superficially, the needs of the three nations are complementary: wealthy Saudi Arabia lacks military capacity, Turkey harbours ambitions across Eurasia and nuclear-armed Pakistan seeks financial support. Their strengths fit neatly together, cemented by a shared Sunni faith.

But it is too early to argue that the Middle East is coming together. The concept of “middle power” may be in vogue after Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called for middle power solidarity amid great power rivalry in his landmark Davos address. Yet neither Pakistan nor Turkey, plainly middle powers, are strictly Middle Eastern countries, despite ambitions to extend their influence.

And the major powers will not walk away. America’s role in the Middle East might shrink in the long term but a new regional security architecture is unlikely to be short of its presence. The European Union, for instance, has talked about strategic autonomy for over a decade. The Ukraine conflict, however, exposed the hollowness of that ambition, as European security still fell back on American leadership and Nato’s military umbrella.

Besides, eroding US influence in the region runs counter to Israel’s interests. Even if Washington were inclined to step back, Tel Aviv would go to great lengths to drag it back into the fray and cling tightly to its American backing – notwithstanding the fact that Israel’s killings in Gaza have shifted public opinion across sizeable segments of the US population, including young Jewish communities.

Beijing has not issued a formal statement on the pact either. It should view the agreement with cautious approval. China has a long-standing preference for locally led security frameworks and supports regional powers in assuming greater responsibility for their stability. The pact complements its push for common and comprehensive security.

In recent years, as China’s clout has grown, voices have increasingly called for Beijing to step in as a security guarantor. Voices are strongest in the Middle East, in part because China is the only major power that has friendly ties with all nations in the region, including Israel.

But this diplomatic balancing act was sustainable partly because regional powers did not have acutely hostile relations with one another before the Gaza war. Should armed conflict erupt, China would find itself squeezed between opposing sides asking for support – a parallel to its predicament over the Russia-Ukraine war.

Russia’s role in the Middle East has shrunk, but it is far from being pushed out of the picture. Ukraine-related obligations have tied down plenty of its energy and other resources, yet Moscow can still sustain its foothold, drawing on long-established diplomatic ties, technical military cooperation with Iran and residual military and political assets in Syria. Although it lacks the capacity to steer major regional events or launch bold new initiatives, Russia can still serve as a secondary diplomatic broker and keep up modest weapons sales.

How far can the pact realistically go? The catch is who, exactly, would invade any of the three. Israel functions as a shared threat more than a direct foe, yet an Israeli military strike against any member is hard to imagine. Israel has no cause to attack Pakistan or Turkey – both are American allies as well. And before the Gaza war erupted, Saudi-Israeli normalisation was almost within reach.

The pact is unquestionably bad news for Tehran: it unites the three most powerful Sunni states, a dynamic that naturally bodes ill for Shiite-led Iran. Backing proxies like the Houthis and Hezbollah will also become more costly. Yet if even Washington cannot make Iran bend, no regional power will dare launch a direct military assault against Tehran. Conversely, Tehran is highly unlikely to start an open war against any Mecca pact member – its doctrine rests on asymmetric leverage and proxy power, rather than territorial invasion.

India, which regards Pakistan as its primary regional threat, will frown on the deal too. With Pakistan now backed by two of the most powerful Muslim nations, New Delhi will have to factor in potential pushback from Saudi Arabia and Turkey when planning military operations in Kashmir. The pact is particularly awkward for India given its traditionally close economic and energy ties with Saudi Arabia, one of India’s largest oil suppliers. Turkey, meanwhile, has long been an outspoken supporter of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.

The pact so far is a straw in the wind – but could it be the first move in a tectonic shift? Throughout its modern history, the region has served as a geopolitical chessboard for external powers. Today, great powers command far less ability to dictate regional outcomes than they did a generation ago. A regional order shaped by regional states is no longer unthinkable.

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